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CASENOTES 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FREEDOM OF SPEECH - MARY-
LAND COURT OF APPEALS HOLDS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
MARYLAND'S ANTI-RESIDENTIAL PICKETING STATUTE. 
STATE v. SCHULLER, 280 Md. 305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Residential picketing presents a conflict between the picketer's 
constitutional right of free speech and the householder's rights of 
privacy and freedom from coercion. In the recent case of State v. 
Schuller,l the Court of Appeals of Maryland, by declaring unconsti-
tutional Maryland's statute banning residential picketing, held in 
favor of freedom of speech. 
Defendants Schuller and Simpkins were among a group of eight 
individuals who, on April 14, 1976, picketed the home of then-
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in Montgomery County, 
Maryland. At no time did any of the picketers obstruct traffic, 
trespass on private property, or engage in any sort of disorderly 
conduct.2 Police arrived on the scene in response to a complaint 
telephoned by one of Rumsfeld's neighbors. Three times police 
officers warned the picketers that their activity violated Maryland 
law. Four of the picketers, including Schuller and Simpkins, refused 
to leave and were charged with violating MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 580A 2 (1976), which provided: "It shall be unlawful for any person 
to engage in picketing before or about the residence or dwelling place 
of any individual."3 
Following their arrests, Schuller and Simpkins were tried in 
district court and convicted of unlawful picketing. Upon appeal, the 
convictions were reversed by the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, which held that subsection 2 of article 27, § 580A violated 
the defendants' constitutional rights of freedom of speech and 
assembly. Moreover, the court held that subsection 4(1) of article 27, 
§ 580A, which exempted from the general prohibition "any picketing 
or assembly in connection with a labor dispute," violated the 
defendants' fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the 
laws.4 
The court of appeals, unanimously affirming the decision of the 
circuit court, held that peaceful residential picketing was protected 
1. 280 Md. 305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977). 
2. [d. at 307, 372 A.2d at 1077. 
3. Violation of the statute was punishable by a fine of not more than one hundred 
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than 90 days, or both. Each day of 
violation of the statute constituted a separate offense. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, 
§ 580A 5 (1976). 
4. 280 Md. at 308, 372 A.2d at 1077-78; Joint Record Extract at 19-20. 
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by the first amendment.5 As the case was one of first impression 
before the court of appeals,6 the court chose to rely on decisions of 
courts of other jurisdictions, particularly the United States Supreme 
Court. Judge Eldridge, writing for the court, noted that although the 
Supreme Court had not specifically considered the constitutionality 
of a statute prohibiting residential picketing,7 the Court had dealt 
extensively with the relationship between picketing and the right of 
free speech.8 
The court of appeals began its discussion by examining 
Thornhill v. Alabama,9 in which the Supreme Court first held that 
picketing was a mode of expression entitled to constitutional 
protection. lO The Thornhill court indicated, however, that a state 
may "preserve the peace and ... protect the privacy, the lives, and 
the property of its residents" by enacting "a statute narrowly drawn 
to cover the precise situation giving rise to the danger."ll 
The court of appeals noted that because picketing was an 
activity including both speech and conduct, it was subject to some 
5. 280 Md. at 316, 372 A.2d at 1082. The court declined sub silentio defendant's 
invitation to declare the statute also in violation of articles 2, 23, and 40 of the 
Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution. See Brief for Appellee at 
1-2. Article 2 declares that the United States Constitution is the supreme law of 
the state; article 23 guarantees due process of law; and article 40 protects freedom 
of speech and of the press. 
6. The Supreme Bench of Baltimore City considered the problem in the 1966 case of 
Molofsky v. Bundy, 34 U.S.L.W. 2582, in which Judge Harris enjoined the 
defendants from picketing the home of an individual who desired to transfer her 
liquor license to defendants' neighborhood. In his opinion, the judge declared, 
"When the right to free speech ... is weighed against the right to privacy, the 
balance favors the privacy of the home." Neither the briefs nor the court of 
appeals' opinion in Schuller cited Molofsky. 
7. The Court, in Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Board, 315 U.S. 740 (1942), held that a Wisconsin statute banning residential 
picketing by parties to a labor dispute was not superseded by federal legislation. 
In its decision the Court declined to review any constitutional question on the 
ground that such questions had not been "properly presented." [d. at 751; accord, 
Auto Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 351 U.S. 266 (1956). 
See DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910, 912 n.1 (D. Conn. 1977). 
8. 280 Md. at 310, 372 A.2d at 1078. 
9. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). 
10. [d.; accord, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). Thornhill was presaged by 
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), 
in which the Court struck down ordinances prohibiting distribution of leaflets 
and circulars, and by Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937), in which 
the Court upheld a Wisconsin statute forbidding courts from enjoining peaceful 
picketing. 
For an early view of picketing, see American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City 
Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921), in which the Court stated that the word 
"picket" indicated a militant purpose inconsistent with peaceful persuasion. [d. 
at 205. The Court, however, did permit the union to post one "representative" at 
the entrance of a plant being struck, for the purpose of communication and 
persuasion. [d. at 206-07. 
11. 310 U.S. at 105, quoted in 280 Md. at 311, 372 A.2d at 1079. 
1977] Casenotes 109 
regulation. 12 Such regulation, however, had to be narrowly drawn to 
reach specific conduct which impinged on "valid state interests."13 
The state argued that the protection of the privacy of the home was a 
valid state interest which could be protected only by a total 
proscription of residential picketing,14 The court rejected this 
contention sub silentio, holding that the Maryland statute's 
prohibition of all residential picketing, regardless of time or manner, 
was too broad. Therefore, the residential picketing statute violated 
the constitutional right of freedom of speech.15 
In the second part of its opinion, the court of appeals considered 
the constitutionality of subsection 4(1) of article 27, § 580A, which 
exempted from the statutory ban any picketing in connection with a 
labor dispute. 16 The court of appeals found that this exemption 
created an impermissible distinction between labor picketing and 
other peaceful picketing, depriving non-labor picketers of equal 
protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment. 17 The court 
reached its conclusion in reliance on Police Department of Chicago 
v. Mosley,18 in which the Supreme Court struck down an anti-
picketing ordinance with a similar exemption for labor picketing. 
II. PICKETING AND THE SUPREME COURT 
The Supreme Court first declared picketing a form of speech 
protected by the first amendment in the 1940 case of Thornhill v. 
Alabama.19 In Thornhill, the Court declared unconstitutional an 
Alabama statute making all labor picketing a criminal offense. The 
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Murphy, equated freedom to 
picket with freedom of the press - a freedom, it noted, dear to the 
hearts of the founding fathers.20 Free dissemination of ideas, the 
Court continued, could not constitutionally be suppressed on any 
issue.21 Because wages and working conditions in industry had an 
12. 280 Md. at 312, 372 A.2d at 1080. The court of appeals relied on Shuttlesworth v. 
Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1969). 
13. 280 Md. at 312, 372 A.2d at 1080. 
14. Id. at 309, 372 A.2d at 1078; Brief for Appellant at 11-15, 18. 
15. 280 Md. at 316, 372 A.2d at 1081-82. 
16. The court quoted but did not discuss subsection 4(2), which exempted "the 
picketing in any lawful manner [of] a person's home when it is also his sole place 
of business." 
17. 280 Md. at 318, 372 A.2d at 1083. The court, declining to presume that the 
legislature would have banned residential picketing without exempting labor 
picketing, refused to sever the offensive exemption from the statute. Id. at 
319-21, 372 A.2d at 1083-84. 
18. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
19. 310 U.S. 88 (1940). See generally Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First 
Amendment, 61 Nw. U. L. REV. 177, 194-97 (1966). 
20. 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 (1940). 
21. Id. at 102-03. 
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importance which transcended the concerns of the parties to a 
particular labor dispute,22 members of a labor union had the right to 
inform the public about labor disputes through the use ofpicketers.23 
The fact that some members of the public may have responded to 
such picketing by boycotting the business which was a party to the 
labor dispute did not justify a statutory ban on all picketing, for 
"[e]very expression of opinion ... has the potentiality of inducing 
action in the interests of one rather than another group in society."24 
Summarizing its thesis in the companion case of Carlson v. 
California,25 the Court concluded: 
The carrying of signs and banners, no less than the raising 
of a flag, is a natural and appropriate means of conveying 
information on matters of public concern. . . . [P]ublicizing 
the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way through 
appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth 
or by banner, must now be regarded as within that liberty of 
communication which is secured to every person by the 
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State.26 
Although the Court in Thornhill noted in dictum that picketing 
was subject to regulation,27 it was not until 1965, in Cox v. Louisiana 
(Cox 1),28 that the Supreme Court provided a clear statement as to 
how a state could constitutionally regulate non-labor, or "public 
issue," picketing.29 In Cox 1 the Court, inter alia,30 upheld the 
constitutionality of a statute prohibiting persons from obstructing 
22. Id. at 103. 
23. 310 U.S. at 103; accord, Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1940). 
24. 310 U.S. at 104. 
25. 310 U.S. 106 (1940). 
26. Id. at 112-13. 
27. 310 U.S. at 105. 
28. 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
29. In the field of labor law, the Supreme Court soon retreated from "the broad 
pronouncements, but not the specific holding, of Thornhill." International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 289 (1957). In 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951), 
the Court held that the National Labor Relations Board's statutory authority to 
enjoin picketing staged in conjunction with secondary boycotts did not abridge 
the right of free speech of those desiring to picket, because such picketing would 
further an unlawful objective. Id. at 705. This statutory authority presently is 
contained in 29 U.S.C. !i 158(b)(4)(A) (1970). In United Mechanics Local 15D-F, 
151 N.L.R.B. 386 (1965), the NLRB held that picketing in front of the homes of 
non·striking employees constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning 
of 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(I). Id. at 393-95. Because that statutory provision prohibits 
coercion only of employees, however, the NLRB lacks authority to enjoin 
picketing in front of the residences of employers. Teamsters Local 695, 204 
N.L.R.B. 866, 870 (1973). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 445 (1970). 
30. The Cox Court also declared a breach of the peace statute unconstitutionally 
vague. 379 U.S. at 551-52. 
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sidewalks, streets, and corridors and entrances of public buildings.31 
Stating that the first and fourteenth amendments did not afford the 
same kind of freedom to persons who wished to communicate ideas 
by marching or picketing as they did to persons who communicated 
ideas by pure speech,32 the Court concluded that the exercise of the 
rights of free speech and assembly could not be permitted to threaten 
public order by, for instance, interfering with the free flow of 
traffic.33 For example, one could not "insist upon a street meeting in 
the middle of Times Square at the rush hour as a form of freedom of 
speech and assembly."34 Accordingly, a narrowly drawn non· 
discriminatory statute constitutionally could be enacted to regulate 
the use of the streets for assemblies and parades according to time, 
place, duration, and the manner of use of the streets.35 
III. REGULATION OF PICKETING 
Any exercise of free speech entails some costs to society. "If it is 
oral, it is noise and may interrupt someone else; if it is written, it 
may be litter."36 A valid restriction on picketing or demonstrating, 
however, cannot be justified merely by legislative preferences or 
beliefs concerning public convenience.37 In order to be constitutional, 
the regulation must be necessary to preserve an important interest of 
society38 having no relation to the first amendment activity 
proscribed.39 Furthermore, the regulation must employ the least 
restrictive means available to safeguard the societal interest 
requiring protection.40 Therefore, courts review statutes regulating 
picketing and demonstrating without the presumption of constitu· 
tionality accorded legislative judgments in other areas.41 
31. Justice Black, in a separate opinion, stated that the statute's exemption of labor 
picketing deprived the defendants of equal protection. Id. at 580-81. The Court 
later adopted this view in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 
97-98 (1972). 
32. 379 U.S. at 555. 
33. Id. at 554. 
34.Id. 
35. Id. at 558. 
36. Kalven, The Concept of a Public Forum, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23. 
37. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). 
38. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); Cameron v. Johnson, 
390 U.S. 611, 617 (1968); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965). 
39. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Reilly v. Noel, 384 F. Supp. 
741, 748 (D.R.1. 1974). 
40. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.s. 516, 530 (1945); Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 
87, 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972); Reilly v. Noel, 384 F. Supp. 741, 
748 (D.R.1. 1974). 
41. Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87, 91 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 
(1972). In Schuller, the state conceded that Maryland's residential picketing 
statute required "strict judicial scrutiny." Brief for Appellant at 21. 
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Societal interests which courts have held sufficient to justify 
restrictions on demonstrations include free flow oftraffic,42 preserva-
tion of government property for the use to which it is lawfully 
dedicated,43 and protection of government operations from substim-
tial interference.44 On the other hand, a possibility that demonstra-
tions at a particular location will trigger violent reactions from 
spectators is an insufficient justification for banning demonstra-
tions at that location.45 While some courts consider the presence of 
an alternative time, place, or manner a factor in determining the 
constitutionality of a restriction,46 other courts have declared that 
this factor is immaterial. 47 Recent Supreme Court decisions, 
moreover, have cast a shadow on the constitutionality of the 
alternative situs doctrine.48 
The constitutional validity of particular restrictions on picketing 
and demonstrating must be determined on a case by case basis. For 
example, a statute banning demonstrations in legislative chambers 
while the legislature is in session may be necessary to protect the 
legislature from substantial disturbance and interference;49 however, 
a total ban on demonstrations in legislative chambers, encompass-
ing periods when the legislature is not in session, may be over-
broad.5O 
42. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 
F.2d 87, 92 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972). 
43. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,47 (1966); see Kirstel v. State, 13 Md. App. 482, 
490, 284 A.2d 12, 17 (1971), cert. denied, 264 Md. 749, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 
943 (1972). 
44. Unemployed Workers Union v. Hackett, 332 F. Supp. 1372, 1379 (D.R.I. 1972); see 
State v. McNair, 178 Neb. 763, 768-69, 135 N.W.2d 463, 466-67 (1965). 
45. National Socialist White People's Party v. Ringers, 473 F.2d 1010, 1014 (4th Cir. 
1973); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 754 (7th Cir. 1972), citing 
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
Movement. Inc. v. City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 674-75 (N.D. Ill. 1976); 
Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of America, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279, 287, 
366 N.E.2d 347, 353 (1977)~ But see Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87, 
91-92 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 912 (1972). 
46. See, e.g., Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942); People Acting 
Through Community Effort v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574, 580 (D.R.I.), rev'd on 
other grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972); Annenberg v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of 
Labor, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 647, 113 Cal. Rptr. 519,525-26 (1974); cf. Lloyd Corp. 
v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 566-67 (1972) (upholding right of shopping center owner 
to exclude pamphleteers from his property). 
47. Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Collin v. Chicago Park Dist., 460 F.2d 746, 752 
(7th Cir. 1972); Wolin v. Port of New York Authority, 392 F.2d 83, 91-92 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Movement, Inc. v. 
City of Chicago, 419 F. Supp. 667, 674 (N.D. Ill. 1976); see Schneider v. State, 308 
U.S. 147, 163 (1939). 
48. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1976); Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). For a discussion of the constitutionality of 
the alternative situs doctrine, see text accompanying notes 118-29 infra. 
49. See State v. McNair, 178 Neb. 763, 768-69, 135 N.W.2d 463, 466-67 (1965). 
50. Cf. Reilly v. Noel, 384 F. Supp. 741 (D.R.I. 1974) (upholding right to demonstrate 
in the rotunda of a state capitol). 
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An example of a valid restriction according to time, place, and 
manner was an ordinance upheld by the Supreme Court in Grayned 
v. City of Rockford.51 In Grayned, the Court affirmed the conviction 
of a defendant who had engaged in a demonstration outside a school 
building, thus violating an ordinance forbidding persons while 
adjacent to a school building from "making . . . any noise or 
diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order 
of [a] school session or class."52 The Court indicated that while a 
total ban on demonstrations outside school buildings would have 
been overbroad,53 a noise restriction on demonstrations held during 
school hours was a valid regulation of time, place, and manner. 54 
The regulation was justified by the substantial governmental 
interest in having "an undisrupted school session conducive to the 
students' learning."55 
IV. RESIDENTIAL PICKETING 
While the Supreme Court has yet to consider the constitutional 
validity of a statute banning residential picketing, it has indicated 
that marching or picketing in residential neighborhoods is an 
activity given some degree of constitutional protection. 56 In the 1969 
decision of Gregory v. City of Chicago, 57 the Court effectively 
declared that, at least in the absence of a specific and narrowly 
drawn statutory prohibition, the streets and sidewalks of residential 
neighborhoods were a public forum. 
Comedian and civil rights activist Dick Gregory had led a group 
of about 85 persons to the home of Mayor Richard Daley. For an 
hour they circled the block on which the mayor's home was located 
as over one thousand spectators, increasingly hostile and violent 
toward the demonstrators, gathered. The police, on the theory that 
they could no longer protect the safety of the marchers, ordered 
Gregory and his group to leave the area. The marchers refused to 
leave and were arrested for disorderly conduct. 58 
The Court, in a brief opinion authored by Chief Justice Warren, 
reversed the convictions. Because there was no evidence that the 
defendants' conduct had been disorderly, their convictions violated 
51. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
52. [d. at 107-08. 
53. [d. at 118. 
54. [d. 
55. [d. 
56. See National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 97 S. Ct. 2215 (1977) 
(reversing injunction); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 
(1971) (reversing injunction); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. III (1969) 
(reversing disorderly conduct conviction). 
57. 394 U.s. III (1969). 
58. For a full discussion of Gregory's march, see id. at 126-30 (appendix to 
concurring opinion of Black, J); Kamin, supra note 19, at 177-82, 231-36. 
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due process.59 Before Gregory, a number of state courts had upheld 
disorderly conduct convictions of peaceful residential picketers on 
the ground that residential picketing, by its very nature, was likely 
to irritate onlookers and catalyze violent reactions against picket-
ers.60 That reasoning was totally repudiated by Gregory. The Court 
came closest to sanctioning peaceful demonstrations before private 
homes as a constitutionally protected activity when it stated, 
"Petitioners' march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the 
sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment."61 
--- Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, issued a concurring 
opinion in which he agreed with the majority that the convictions 
violated due process. He reached this conclusion because of the 
absence of a statute banning demonstrations in residential neighbor-
hoods. He believed, however, that such a statute would be constitu-
tional: 
[N]o mandate in our Constitution leaves States and 
governmental units powerless to pass laws to protect the 
public from the kind of boisterous and threatening conduct 
that disturbs the tranquility of spots selected by the people 
... for homes, wherein they can escape the hurly-burly of 
the outside business and political world .... 
Were the authority of government so trifling as to permit 
anyone with a complaint to have the vast power to do 
anything he pleased, wherever he pleased, and whenever he 
pleased, ... homes, the sacred retreat to which families 
repair for their privacy and their daily way of living, would 
have to have their doors thrown open to all who desired to 
convert the occupants to new views, new morals, and a new 
way of life. Men and women who hold public office would be 
59. The Supreme Court had previously overturned disorderly conduct convictions of 
peaceful non-residential demonstrators. See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 
(1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Henry v. City of Rock Hall, 376 U.S. 
776 (1964); and Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
60. "Conduct is disorderly ... when it is of such nature as to affect the peace and 
quiet of persons who may witness the same and who may be disturbed or 
provoked to resentment thereby." State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 357, 229 N.W. 
311, 312 (1930). 
In State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285 N.W. 903 (1939), disorderly conduct 
convictions of peaceful residential picketers were affirmed despite a total absence 
of onlookers at the scene of the picketing. The court labeled the picketing as 
"likely to arouse anger, disturbance, or violence." [d. at 337, 285 N.W. at 905; 
accord, State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 265 N.W. 302 (1936); People v. Levner,30 
N.Y.S.2d 487 (1941). Contra, Flores v. City and County of Denver, 122 Colo. 71, 
220 P.2d 373 (1950). For a defense of disorderly conduct arrests in situations 
comparable to Gregory, see Kamin, supra note 19, at 219-25. 
61. 394 U.S. at 112. Although arguably dictum, see Tassin v. Local 832, Nat'l Union 
of Police Officers, 311 So. 2d 591, 592-93 (La. App. 1975) (Samuel, J., dissenting), 
the statement was authoritatively adopted by the Court in Police Department of 
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972). 
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compelled, simply because they did hold public office, to lose 
the comforts and privacy of an unpicketed home. I believe 
that our Constitution . . . did not create a government with 
. such monumental weaknesses. Speech and press are, of 
.' course, to be free,. . . [b Jut picketing and demonstrating can 
be regulated like other conduct of men. I believe the homes of 
men, sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary, and 
the sick, can be protected by government from noisy, 
marching, tramping, threatening picketers and demonstra-
tors bent on filling the minds of men, women, and children 
with fears of the unknown.62 
Although this was only a concurring opinion, courts have relied 
upon it to uphold statutes banning residential picketing, while 
completely ignoring the opinion of the Gregory majority.63 Only in 
the Connecticut case of State v. Anonymous64 has a court decided 
that the majority opinion in Gregory required it to hold unconstitu-
tional a statute banning residential picketing.65 In Schuller, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland discussed only the concurring opinion 
in Gregory and interpreted it merely to authorize a statute to 
prohibit "noisy, marching, tramping, threatening picketers and 
demonstrators" in residential neighborhoods.66 Such a limited 
interpretation of Justice Black's concurring opinion appears to be 
unique. 
Even if the streets and sidewalks of residential neighborhoods 
are a public forum, a narrowly drawn non-discriminatory statute 
constitutionally may be enacted to regulate their use as a public 
forum according to time, place, duration, or manner of use.67 The 
issue is whether a statutory ban on all residential picketing is a 
valid regulation of place. 
A. Residential Picketing and The Right of Privacy 
To date, courts have considered constitutional challenges to five 
statutes banning residential picketing. Three of these statutes were 
62. 394 U.S. at 118, 125-26. 
63. Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 544-45 (10th Cir. 1974); People Acting Through 
Community Effort v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574, 578 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other 
grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972); City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 
182 N.W.2d 530 (1971). References to Justice Black's concurrence are found 
throughout the Wauwatosa opinion. See Tassin v. Local 832, Nat'l Union of 
Police Officers, 311 So. 2d 591, 592-93 (La. App. 1975) (Samuel, J., dissenting); 
Brief for Appellant at 10-12, State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977). 
64. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 372, 274 A.2d 897 (1971). . 
65. The court in Anonymous construed the statute under consideration as 
prohibiting only picketing of the homes of strikebreaking employees. This statute 
is presently found in CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.o§31-120 (1972). See DeGregory v. 
Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977). 
66. 280 Md. at 315, 372 A.2d at 108I. 
67. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965). 
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upheld on the ground that the protection of the privacy of the 
individual householder was a substantial societal interest justifying 
a total proscription of residential picketing.68 Despite these opinions, 
the right of privacy was scarcely mentioned by the Schuller court.69 
Those opposed to residential picketing view the householder as a 
helpless captive of persons wishing to force him to receive their 
communications. The proposition that the right of privacy consti-
tutes a societal interest of sufficient magnitude to justify constitu-
tionally a statutory ban on residential picketing received forceful 
support in the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in City of 
Wauwatosa u. King: 70 
Tranquility and privacy are fragile enough flowers, particu-
larly in a home setting .... Home is many things, most of 
them intangibles, not just a house and shelter, but an 
opportunity to rest, relax and recharge batteries for the 
morrow. Of such ingredients is tranquility made up, and 
privacy derived. Can it be seriously contended that the 25 to 
35 picketers parading up and down in front of the homes 
here involved did not adversely affect the well-being, 
tranquility and privacy of the folks at home in their homes? 
To those inside and to the neighbors, the home becomes 
something less than a home when and while the picketing, 
demonstrating and parading continue. . . . [T]he very fact 
of the physical patrolling and marching by the group of 
uninvited and unwelcome paraders creates pressure. The 
newsworthiness of the situation stems in part from the 
tensions created and pressures focused on the home. Such 
tensions and pressures may be psychological, not physical, 
but they are not, for that reason, less inimical to family 
privacy and truly domestic, tranquility. If, as we have said, it 
is a proper public purpose to protect both privacy and 
tranquility, then the prohibiting of picketing before or about 
the home is a clearly related and entirely reasonable means 
to such end.71 
68. Compare Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), People Acting Through 
Community Effort v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 
468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972), and City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 
N.W.2d 530 (1971); with State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 372, 274 A.2d 897 
(1971) and State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977). See DeGregory v. 
Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977). 
69. The court of appeals was content simply to quote a portion of Justice Black's 
concurring opinion in Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969), dealing 
with privacy and contend that it did not authorize a complete statutory ban on 
residential picketing. For a general discussion by the court of appeals of the 
constitutional right of privacy, see Montgomery County v. Walsh, 274 Md. 489, 
511-13,336 A.2d 97,104-05 (1975), appeal dismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976); Doe v. 
Commander, Wheaton Police Dep't., 273 Md. 262, 272-73, 329 A.2d 35, 41-42 
(1974). 
70. 49 Wis. 2d 398, 182 N.W.2d 530 (1971), reprinted in 42 A.L.R.3d 1341 (1972). 
71. Id. at 411-12,182 N.W.2d at 537; accord, City of Brookfield v. Groppi, 50 Wis. 2d 
166, 184 N.W.2d 96 (1971); see Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 118, 
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Several cases have reached the Supreme Court which dealt with 
the question of a homeowner's right to exclude from his home 
unwanted communications in forms other than picketing. In Martin 
v. Struthers,72 the Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Black, 
declared unconstitutional an ordinance prohibiting door to door 
solicitation. Although noting that the ordinance may have been 
"aimed at the protection of the householder from annoyance,"73 the 
Court held that the right of free speech outweighed the privacy 
interests at stake: 
[D]oor to door campaigning is one of the most accepted 
techniques of seeking popular support. . . . Door to door 
distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed 
causes of little people. 
Freedom to distribute information to every citizen 
wherever he desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the 
preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable 
police and health regulations of time and manner of 
distribution, it must be fully preserved. The dangers of 
distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional legal 
methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide 
whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent 
prohibition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the 
Constitution, the naked restriction of the dissemination of 
ideas.74 
Six years after the Martin decision, the Court, in Kovacs v. 
Cooper,75 upheld the constitutionality· of an ordinance banning 
sound trucks in public streets. The Court stated that while a 
homeowner was free to bar a door to door solicitor from entering 
his home, "he [was] practically helpless to escape the interference 
with his privacy by loud speakers except through the protection of 
124-26 (1969) (Black, J., concurring); Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 544-45 (10th 
Cir. 1974); Annenberg v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Labor, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 
645-46, 113 Cal. Rptr. 519, 524-25 (1974); Keefe v. Organization for a Better 
Austin, 115 Ill. App. 2d 236, 252, 253 N.E.2d 76, 84 (1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 415 
(1971); Molofsky v. Bundy, 34 U.S.L.W. 2582 (Supreme Bench BaIt. City 1966); 
State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 336, 285 N.W. 903, 905 (1939); State v. Perry, 196 
Minn. 481, 482, 265 N.W. 302 (1936); State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 356, 229 N.W. 
311 (1930); People v. Levner, 30 N.Y.S.2d 487, 493 (1941); Pipe Machinery Co. v. 
DeMore, 36 Ohio Op. 342, 343-44, 76 N.E.2d 725, 727 (1947), appeal dismissed, 
149 Ohio St. 582, 79 N.E.2d 910 (1948). 
72. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
73. Id. at 144. 
74. Id. at 146-47. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 
425 U.S. 610 (1976), may have narrowed the holding in Martin. The Court, while 
declaring unconstitutionally vague an ordinance which required door to door 
solicitors to notify police before soliciting, indicated in dicta that a proper 
notification statute could be drawn. Protection either of public safety or of 
peacful enjoyment of the home would be substantial societal interests justifying 
such a statute. Id. at 619-20. 
75. 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
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the municipality."76 The Court rejected the proposition that the use 
of sound trucks was "essential to the poorly financed causes of little 
people,"77 and declined "to call forth constitutional protection for 
what those charged with public welfare reasonably think is a 
nuisance when easy means of publicity are open."78 
More recently, in Rowan v. United States Post Office,79 the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute under 
which a householder could require a mailer to remove the house-
holder's name from his mailing lists and stop all further mailings to 
him.80 After comparing this statutory right to the right of a 
homeowner to exclude unwanted door to door solicitors of literature 
from his home,81 the Court concluded: 
[N]o one has a right to press even 'good' ideas on an 
unwilling recipient. That we are often 'captives' outside the 
sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech 
and other sound does not mean we must be captives 
everywhere. 82 
On the other hand, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,83 the 
Court declared that an ordinance prohibiting the showing of nudity 
at any drive-in theater where the film was visible "from any public 
street or public place" violated the first amendment. The Court found 
that the intrusion into the privacy of the home that was present in 
Rowan was absent in Erznoznik,84 despite the fact that defendant 
theater owner's screen was visible from nearby residences.85 Absent 
a showing that substantial privacy interests were being invaded in 
an intolerable manner, the burden fell upon the offended viewer 
simply to avert his eyes.86 
By analogy, the rationales of Kovacs v. Cooper and Grayned v. 
City of Rockford87 appear to permit a state to prohibit picketers in 
76. [d. at 87. 
77. The quotation is from Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
78. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88-89 (1949). Justice Black attacked this 
reasoning in a dissenting opinion, id. at 102-03. If statutes of the Martin and 
Kovacs variety were held constitutional, he argued, the right of free speech would 
soon be enjoyed only by those wealthy enough to own news media or to purchase 
advertisements therein. While stating that, because of the nuisance potential 
inherent in the use of sound trucks, a city could impose on such use reasonable 
regulations according to time, place, and manner, he stated that a ban on their 
use anywhere in a city violated the first amendment. [d. at 104. 
79. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). 
80. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 (Supp. IV 1964) (current version at 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1970». 
81. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 148 (1943). 
82. 397 U.S. at 738. 
83. 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
84. [d. at 209, 211-12. 
85. [d. at 221 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
86. [d. at 211; accord, Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
87. 408 U.S. 104 (1972). See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra. 
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front of private residences from chanting or otherwise making noises 
loud enough to be heard inside the picketed homes.88 Moreover, a 
statute which requires residential picketers first to notify police 
would likely be upheld, provided that the statute was designed to 
protect against possible disorder.89 The holding of Organization for a 
Better Austin v. Keefe,90 however, seems to refute the argument that 
the constitutional right of privacy would justify a statutory ban on 
residential picketing. 
The Organization for a Better Austin distributed leaflets 
describing Keefe, a real estate broker, as a "blockbuster" and a 
"panic peddler." Two of the leaflets urged recipients to telephone 
Keefe at his home; another threatened a boycott of Westchester, 
lllinois, stores. The leaflets were distributed at a Westchester 
shopping center, outside Keefe's church, and under the doors of 
Keefe's neighbors. Keefe sought an injunction. At trial an OBA 
official admitted that the primary purpose of the organization's 
activities was to pressure Keefe into signing a no-solicitation 
agreement prepared by OBA.91 The injunction was granted; it 
included a ban on picketing, although no picketing had occurred.92 
The Appellate Court of Illinois held that "the protection of the 
privacy of home and family" outweighed any interest in free 
speech.93 The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice 
Burger, rejected this contention: 
Designating the conduct as an invasion of privacy. . is 
not sufficient to support an injunction against peaceful 
distribution of informational literature of the nature re-
vealed by this record. Rowan v. United States Post Office 
... is not in point; the right of privacy involved in that case 
is not shown here. Among other important distinctions, 
respondent is not attempting to stop the flow of information 
into his own household, but to the public.94 
Residential picketing, like the distribution of leaflets involved in 
Keefe, necessarily entails some communication to neighbors and 
passers-by, although in most cases informing or coercing the target 
88. The Schuller court implied that a statute constitutionally may prohibit noisy 
residential picketers. 280 Md. at 315, 316, 372 A.2d at 1081. Arresting quiet 
picketers because they attract noisy spectators would, of course, be the 
equivalent of arresting peaceful picketers because they attract disorderly 
spectators, a practice condemned by the Supreme Court in Gregory v. City of 
Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). 
89. Cf. Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 619-20 (1976). 
90. 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
91. Keefe v. Organization for a Better Austin, 115 Ill. App. 2d 236, 238-39, 253 
N.E.2d 76, 77-78 (1969), rev'd, 402 U.S. 415 (1971). 
92. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 417 (1971). 
93. 115 Ill. App. 2d at 252, 253 N.E.2d at 84. 
94. 402 U.S. at 419-20. 
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of the picketing may be the dominant motive. Requiring picketers in 
front of private homes to walk quietly reduces, but does not entirely 
eliminate, the status of the picketed householder as a captive 
audience. The Court in Keefe nonetheless appeared to weigh this 
conflict between the right of privacy and the right of free speech in 
favor of the latter. Under this reasoning, a homeowner offended by 
picketing is thus under the burden of averting his eyes by drawing 
the shades or by simply not looking through the window. Admit-
tedly, the homeowner may avoid the unwanted communication only 
by becoming a prisoner in his own home; however, his constitutional 
right of privacy is considerably reduced when he leaves the 
sanctuary of his home for his lawn or for places outside his 
property. 95 By proscribing peaceful residential picketing, the 
Maryland statute had in effect extended the protected zone of the 
homeowner from his lawn to a point outside his neighborhood. The 
ability of government constitutionally to provide such an extended 
zone seems to have been denied by the Court in Keefe. 96 
B. Residential Picketing and Coercion 
In Cox v. Louisiana (Cox II),97 the Supreme Court, upholding a 
statute prohibiting picketing near a courthouse, stated: 
[J]udges are human; and the legislature has the right to 
recognize the danger that some judges, jurors, and other 
court officials, will be consciously or unconsciously influ-
enced by demonstrations in or near their courtrooms both 
prior to and at the time of the trial. . . . Suppose demonstra-
tors paraded and picketed for weeks with signs asking that 
indictments be dismissed, and that a judge, completely 
uninfluenced by these demonstrations, dismissed the indict-
ments. A State may protect against the possibility of a 
conclusion by the public under these circumstances that the 
judge's action was in part a product of intimidation and did 
not flow only from the fair and orderly working of the 
judicial process.98 
95. See Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 464 (1952); cf. Air Pollution 
Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa, 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974); Hester v. United 
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924) (evidence seized without a warrant, on private 
property, but in open fields, admissible against property owner at trial). But see 
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
96. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in· upholding a 
statutory ban on residential picketing, apparently rejected this interpretation of 
Keefe. Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 544-45 (10th Cir. 1974) (citing only the 
decision of the Illinois court). See People Acting Through Community Effort v. 
Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574, 580 (D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st 
Cir. 1972); Annenberg v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Labor, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 519 (1974). 
97. 379 U.S. 559 (1965). 
98. Id. at 565. 
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Professor Kamin, in an article written a decade ago, argued that 
the protection afforded to judges and jurors in courthouses should be 
extended to public officials in their homes. Public officials, he 
contended, should be free to make decisions free from the "physical 
intimidation and coercion" of residential picketing: 
If public decisions are to be made in this way, the group 
which can bring the greatest amount of physical power to 
bear upon public officials will see its views prevail. A 
government somewhere might function in this way - but it 
would not be a democracy. 99 . 
Historically, most courts which have enjoined residential 
picketing have done so on the ground that such activity is motivated 
primarily by a desire to coerce and intimidate the individual being 
picketed and thus is not entitled to constitutional protection.100 The 
value of these cases as precedent, however, must be questioned in 
light of Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe. 
Keefe presented a very strong case of coercion.1Ol In upholding 
an injunction against leafleting, the Appellate Court of TIlinois 
stated, "Coercion, not speech, was the purpose and object of 
defendants' activities."lo2 The Supreme Court reversed: 
The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a 
coercive impact on respondent does not remove them from 
the reach of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly 
intended to influence respondent's conduct by their activities 
. . . . Petitioners were engaged openly and vigorously in 
making the public aware of respondent's real estate 
practices. Those practices were offensive to them, as the 
views and practices of petitioners are no doubt offensive to 
others. But so long as the means are peaceful, the 
communication need not meet standards of acceptability.lo3 
99. Kamin, supra note 19, at 231. 
100. See Hall v. Hawaiian Pineapple Co., 72 F. Supp. 533, 537 (D. Haw. 1947); S. Cal. 
Iron and Steel Co. v. Ass'n of Iron Workers, 186 Cal. 604, 619, 621, 200 P. 1, 7, 8 
(1921); Jacobs v. United Furniture Workers, 16 C.C.H. LAB. CAS. ~65,065, at 
75,372, 75,379 (L.A. County Super. Ct. Cal. 1949); Tassin v. Local 832, Nat'l 
Union of Police Officers, 311 So. 2d 591, 592-93 (La. App. 1975) (dissenting 
opinions); State v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 311 (1930); Evening Times 
Printing & Publishing Co. v. American Newspaper Guild, 124 N.J. Eq. 71, 81, 199 
A. 598, 604 (1938); Hebrew Home and Hosp. for Chronic Sick, Inc. v. Davis, 38 
Misc. 2d 173,177-78,235 N.Y.S.2d 318, 323-24 (1962); Petrucci v. Hogan, 5 Misc. 
2d 480, 490, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718, 728 (1941); Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical & 
Machine Workers, 56 Ohio Abs. 426, 92 N.E.2d 446 (1950); Pipe Machinery Co. v. 
DeMore, 36 Ohio Op. 342, 343, 76 N.E.2d 725, 726 (1947). The Schuller court did 
not discuss coercion as a possible ground for upholding the statute. 
101. See text accompanying note 91 supra. 
102. Keefe v. Organization for a Better Austin, 115 Ill. App. 2d 236, 252, 253 N.E.2d 
76, 84 (1969). 
103. 402 U.S. at 419; see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). 
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Nonetheless, Cox II makes clear that, in certain limited 
situations, picketing may be barred on the ground of coercion. The 
rationale of Cox II, which upheld a ban on demonstrations near a 
courthouse, logically encompasses a ban on picketing in front of a 
judge's home.104 The holding of Keefe, however, would indicate that 
in most other situations, residential picketing would not be barred 
merely because it necessarily includes elements of coercion. 
V. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE ALTERNATIVE SITUS 
An equal protection issue arises when the legislature exempts 
labor pickets from an anti-picketing statute. In the area of 
residential picketing, such an exemption is usually limited to the 
situation in which a home sought to be picketed is the place of 
employment involved in the labor dispute.105 The statute invalidated 
by the court of appeals in Schuller, however, contained a broader 
exemption for "any picketing in connection with a labor dispute."lo6 
Courts have justified a statutory exemption for domestic employees 
on the grounds that it is necessary to preserve an employee's right to 
picket at the site of the subject matter of his dispute, and that the 
homeowner, by becoming an employer, impliedly consents to the 
possibility that his home may become the site of labor picketing 
should a dispute arise.107 One court indicated that, without an 
104. See Hebrew Home and Hosp. for Chronic Sick, Inc. v. Davis, 38 Misc. 2d 173, 235 
N.Y.S.2d 318 (1962); Fawick Airflex Co. v. United Electrical & Machine Workers, 
56 Ohio Abs. 426, 92 N.E.2d 446 (1950), appeal dismissed, 154 Ohio St. 205, 93 
N.E.2d 769 (1950). See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 1297 (1974). 
In the field of labor law, the National Labor Relations Board has authority 
under 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A) (1970) to enjoin picketing by unions at the homes of 
strikebreaking employees. See Teamsters Local 695, 204 N.L.R.B. 866, 870 (1973); 
United Mechanics Local 150-F, 151 N.L.R.B. 386 (1965). Although the 
constitutionality of this authority has yet to be tested, the time would appear to 
be ripe for such a test in view of Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976), and 
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), which indicated that 
distinctions may not be drawn between different communications on the basis of 
their content. See text accompanying notes 125-29. Under 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(b)(1)(A) (1970), a person's right to picket a private home in Maryland now 
depends on the message on the picket sign. Justice Black, in his concurring 
opinion in NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 76-80 
(1964), stated his belief that the NLRB's authority to enjoin picketing is 
unconstitutional in so far as it is based solely on the message sought to be 
conveyed. Justice Black's concurrence was cited favorably by the Mosley Court. 
Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972). But see DeGregory v. 
Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977) (upholding Connecticut statute 
interpreted to prohibit labor picketing in residential areas, but to permit other 
picketing). . 
105. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-1443 (Supp. 1975); HAW. REV. STAT. §379 A-I 
(Supp. 1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 21.1-2 (Supp. 1977). 
106. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 580A 4(1) (1976). 
107. People Acting Through Community Effort v. Doorley, 338 F. Supp. 574, 580-81 
(D.R.I.), rev'd on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 1972); City of Wauwatosa 
v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 413-14, 182 N.W.2d 530, 537-38 (1971); see Annenberg v. 
S. Cal. Dist. Council of Labor, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 647-48,113 Cal. Rptr. 519, 526 
(1974). 
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exemption for domestic workers, a statute prohibiting residential 
picketing would deprive these workers of equal protection by 
eliminating the only site at which they may picket. lOB 
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,109 the Supreme 
Court held that an ordinance which barred picketers within 150 feet 
of a school building during school hours, unless the school was 
involved in a labor dispute, violated the equal protection clause of 
the fourteenth amendment: 
The operative distinction is the message on a picket sign. 
But, above all else, the First Amendment means that the 
government has no power to restrict expression because of 
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content .... 
. . . [G]overnment may not grant the use of a forum to 
people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those 
wishing to express less favored or more controversial 
views. . . . Once a forum is opened up to assembly or 
speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit 
others from assembling or speaking on the basis of what 
they intend to say.110 
The broad exemption of all labor picketing in subsection 4(1) of 
Maryland's residential picketing statute clearly violated the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as interpreted by the 
Mosley Court. lll It is uncertain whether an exemption limited to 
domestic employees would likewise be deemed unconstitutional. The 
United 'States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has held 112 that 
an anti-residential picketing ordinance which exempted "pIcketing 
in any lawful manner during a labor dispute of the place of 
employment, involved in such labor dispute" violated the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. On the other hand, a 
108. City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d 398, 414, 182 N.W.2d 530, 538 (1971). 
Although a state may limit labor picketing to the situs of the dispute, see 
Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 727-28 
(1942); DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910, 915 (D. Conn. 1977), Maryland 
courts are forbidden by statute from enjoining labor picketing in "any public 
street or any place where any person or persons may lawfully be." MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 100, § 65(e) (1964). 
109. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
110. [d. at 95-96. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
had declared the ordinance unconstitutional as a violation of freedom of speech, 
Mosley v. Police Dep't of Chicago, 432 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1970), the Supreme 
Court found it unnecessary to address this aspect, resting its decision on the 
equal protection clause. An ordinance identical to that in Mosley was likewise 
struck down on equal protection grounds in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 107 (1972), decided the same day as Mosley. 
111. The state had argued that this clause merely permitted picketers at an 
employer's place of business. Brief for Appellant at 23, State v. Schuller, 280 Md. 
305, 372 A.2d 1076 (1977). 
112. People Acting Through Community Effort v. Doorley, 468 F.2d 1143 (1st Cir. 
1972). 
124 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 7 
California appellate court, in an opinion which did not cite Mosley, 
indicated that domestic employees were permitted to picket their 
employer's home only in instances in which the picketing resulted in 
minimal invasion of the employer's privacy; in that case, for 
example, hundreds of acres of privately owned land separated the 
picketers from the home.l13 More recently, a three judge federal 
court, in DeGregory v. Giesing,114 rejected an equal protection 
challenge to a statute construed to prohibit residential picketing in 
connection with a labor dispute except in the case of a home which 
was the place of employment involved in a dispute.1l5 The 
DeGregory court stated that, notwithstanding Mosley, subject 
matter distinctions were permissible if they were precisely tailored to 
serve a substantial governmental interest,11s The subject matter 
distinctions drawn by the statute were justified, in the court's view, 
by the state's substantial interest in limiting the scope of a labor 
dispute to the situs of the dispute.1l7 
----The Mosley decision also makes doubtful one of the grounds on 
which residential picketing has been enjoined - the availability of 
alternative sites for the picketing. Courts utilizing the alternative 
situs doctrine permit picketing of homes only if no alternative site 
for the picketing exists,118 or at least, view the possibility of 
alternative sites as a factor to be weighed against such picketing.1l9 
Except in cases of picketing by domestic employees, residential 
picketers usually have alternative sites for their picketing; in 
Schuller, the alternative sites were the public areas adjacent to the 
Pentagon. l20 
113. Annenberg v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Labor, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 648, 113 Cal. 
Rptr. 519, 526 (1974). No anti·picketing statute was involved in this case. See 
Jewish Defense League v. Washington, 347 F. Supp. 1300 (D.D.C. 1972) 
(upholding labor exemption contained in statute banning picketing within 500 
feet of an embassy). 
114. 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977). 
115. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §31-120 (1972). See State v. Anonymous, 6 Conn. Cir. 
Ct. 372, 274 A.2d 897 (1971). 
116. 427 F. Supp. at 913-14. DeGregory relied on Young v. American Mini Theatres, 
427 U.S. 50, 63-71, 82-83 n.6 (1976). 
117. 427 F. Supp. at 915. 
118. See Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to Rejuvenate Tenant Housing, 433 Pa. 
578, 253 A.2d 622 (1969); City of Wauwatosa v. King, 49 Wis. 2d at 413-14, 182 
N.W.2d at 537-38 (1971). 
119. See Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942); Annenberg v. S. 
Cal. Dist. Council of Labor, 38 Cal. App. 3d 637, 647, 113 Cal. Rptr. 519,525-26 
(1974); Tassin v. Local 832, Nat'l Union of Police Officers, 311 So. 2d 591, 593-94 
(La. App. 1975) (Lemmon, J., dissenting). See also State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 
265 N.W. 302 (1936); Evening Times Printing & Publishing Co. v. American 
Newspaper Guild, 124 N.J. Eq. 71, 83, 199 A. 598, 605 (1938); Note, Picketing the 
Homes of Public Officials, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 106, 121-23 (1966). 
120. On the right to demonstrate in the concourse of the Pentagon, see United States 
v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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The alternative situs doctrine appeared to have reached its 
zenith in the case of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,121 in which the Supreme 
Court held that the owner of a shopping center was free to bar 
persons desiring to distribute leaflets when the activity was not 
"directly related in its purpose to the use to which the shopping 
center property was being put."122 Thus, the Court apparently held 
that striking employees of individual stores, with no alternative sites 
at which to picket, could not be barred from shopping center 
property; however, persons desiring to exercise first amendment 
rights on issues unrelated to the shopping center could be 
excluded.123 In the latter instance the Court noted: 
It would be an unwarranted infringement of property 
rights to require them to yield to the exercise of First 
Amendment rights under circumstances where alternative 
avenues of communication exist.124 
The Court's subsequent decision in Mosley casts a shadow on 
the constitutional validity of the alternative situs test apparently 
used in Lloyd. Whether alternative sites exist depends upon the 
message on the picket sign.125 Mosley seems to indicate that drawing 
a distinction between communications based on the messages 
sought to be conveyed is unconstitutional.126 Applying this principle, 
the Court, in Hudgens v. NLRB,127 overruled its apparent holding in 
Lloyd and held that the owner of a shopping center may in all cases 
bar picketers from the property. The Court decided that a privately 
owned shopping center is not dedicated to public use to the extent 
that persons are entitled to exercise first amendment rights therein. 
By way of dit.um, the Court noted that if a shopping center were 
deemed to be the functional equivalent of a municipality, then any 
121. 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
122. Id. at 563, quoting Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 
U.S. 308, 320 n.9 (1968). 
123. The Supreme Court later denied that this had been the holding of Lloyd. See 
, Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 518-20 (1976). Before Hudgens, however, 
commentators has unanimously interpreted Lloyd in the manner stated in the 
text. See, e.g., Lewis, Free Speech and Property Rights Re·Equated: The Supreme 
Court Ascends from Logan Valley, 24 LAB. L. J. 195,199-200 (1973); Note, Uoyd 
v. Tanner: The Demise of Logan Valley and the Disguise of Marsh, 61 GEO. L. J. 
1187, 1190, 1209, 1212 (1973); 57 MINN. L. REV. 603, 607 (1973); 27 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 219,222,224 (1972); 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 427, 432. See also 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 
1032, 1038-39 (1976). 
124. 407 U.S. at 567. One commentator has stated that the alternative situs rationale 
used to bar picketers from private property in Lloyd should not be extended to 
bar residential picketers from public streets and sidewalks. See Note, Picketers at 
the Doorstep, 9 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS - ClY. LIB. L. REV. 95, 105-06 (1974) 
[hereinafter cited as Doorstep]. 
125. See NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964) (Black, 
J., concurring). 
126. See text accompanying notes 109-10. 
127. 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
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exclusion of picketers based on the criteria which seemed to have 
been enunciated in Lloyd would constitute discrimination in the 
regulation of expression on the basis of the content of the 
expression.128 "[I]f the respondents in the Lloyd case did not have a 
first amendment right to enter that shopping center to distribute 
handbills concerning Vietnam, then the pickets in the present case 
did not have a first amendment right to enter this shopping center 
for the purpose of advertising their strike."129 Mosley, as interpreted 
by this dictum in Hudgens, may thus spell the end of the alternative 
situs doctrine in so far as the doctrine is used as a criterion for 
determining whether specific persons may picket at a particular site. 
VI. PICKETING THE HOMES OF PRIVATE PERSONS 
Some commentators would attach importance to whether an 
individual whose home is picketed is a public or private person.l30 
Those who advocate a distinction on this basis find support in the 
Supreme Court's decisions in the field of defamation. 131 Although the 
target of the leafleting in Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe 
could have been characterized as a private person active in a matter 
of public interest,132 the Court did not discuss whether private 
persons were entitled to a greater protection of privacy than persons 
involved in public affairs. 
Aside from labor dispute cases and Keefe, the only reported 
appellate case involving picketing of a private person's home is 
Hibbs v. Neighborhood Organization to Rejuvenate Tenant Hous· 
ing.133 In Hibbs, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania permitted 
tenants to picket their landlord's home, on the ground of lack of 
alternative situs.134 In a larger number of cases, dissatisfied 
consumers, home purchasers, and tenants have sought to picket the 
office of parties with whom they entered contractual relations. l35 
128. [d. at 520. 
129. [d. at 520-21. 
130. See generally Doorstep, supra note 124, at 114-16, 121-22. 
131. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323 (1974); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); accord, General 
Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 277 Md. 165, 352 A.2d 810 (1976); Jacron Sales Co. v. 
Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 350 A.2d 688 (1976). 
132. See text accompanying note 91. 
133. 433 Pa. 578, 252 A.2d 622 (1969). 
134. See generally Note, Residential Picketing of Slum Landlords, 1971 URB. L. ANN. 
223. 
135. Compare Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 11 So. 2d 383 (1943); Menard 
v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937), Roberts v. Ryan Homes, Inc., 70 
Misc. 2d 198, 333 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1972); Springfield, Bayside Corp. v. Hochman, 44 
Misc. 2d 882, 255 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1964), West Willow Realty Corp. v. Taylor, 23 
Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (1960); Saxon Motor Sales, Inc. v. Torino, 166 
Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1938), and Mazzocone v. Willing, 369 A.2d 829 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1976) with Singer v. Romerrick Realty Corp., 255 App. Div. 715, 5 
N.Y.S.2d 607 (1938), Dicta Realty Assoc. v. Shaw, 50 Misc. 2d 267, 270 N.Y.S.2d 
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These cases typically have reached courts on motions to enjoin the 
publication of defamatory material. In Prucha v. Weiss,136 the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland held that a court of equity lacked power to 
issue an injunction restraining publication of defamatory matter.137 
A possible exception to the Prucha rule may be a situation in which 
restraint of defamatory publication becomes essential to the 
preservation of a business. l3B Authority is split as to whether a court 
may enjoin picketing of a business by consumers on the basis of this 
exception. l39 Since Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 
however, peaceful consumer picketing may be an activity which is 
constitutionally protected regardless of the truth of the message 
displayed on the signs. Courts adopting this view limit businesses to 
a remedy at law. l40 If the exception to the Prucha rule remains 
constitutionally valid, however, then a businessman whose home is 
the target of defamatory picketing may be able to enjoin the 
picketing when the home serves as his place of business, or when the 
picketing triggers significant adverse publicity in the news media 
and the resulting consumer reaction threatens the preservation of 
his business. The residential picketing statute struck down by the 
Schuller court contained a subsection which authorized a court of 
equity to enjoin residential picketers and to award damages against 
the picketers.l4l As this subsection was among the ones invalidated 
by the court, there appear to be no other grounds upon which a court 
may enjoin the picketing of homes of private persons. 
VII. A PROPOSED RESIDENTIAL PICKETING STATUTE 
The court of appeals in Schuller implied that a statute could be 
enacted providing constitutionally reasonable regulations according 
342 (1966), Julie Baking Co. v. Graymond, 152 Misc. 846, 274 N.Y.S. 250 (1934), 
Schmoldt v. Oakley, 390 P.2d 882 (Okla. 1964), Stansbury v. Beckstrom, 491 
S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973), and McMorries v. Hudson Sales Corp., 233 
S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 227 (1975). 
There are no reported appellate cases in Maryland involving consumer picketing. 
136. 233 Md. 479, 197 A.2d 253, cert. denied, 377 U.S. 992 (1964). 
137. Id. at 484, 197 A.2d at 256. 
138. Nann v. Raimist, 255 N.Y. 307, 317, 174 N.E. 690, 694 (1931); see Warren House 
Co. v. Handwerger, 240 Md. 177, 179, 213 A.2d 574, 575 (1965). 
139. Compare Carter v. Knapp Motor Co., 243 Ala. 600, 604, 11 So. 2d 383, 385 (1943); 
Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937), Roberts v. Ryan Homes, 
Inc., 70 Misc. 2d 198,203,333 N.Y.S.2d 564, 569 (1972), and Mazzocone v. Willing, 
369 A.2d 829 (pa. Super. Ct. 1976) with Schmoldt v. Oakley, 390 P.2d 882 (Okla. 
1964) and Stansbury v. Beckstrom, 491 S.w.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
140. See Mazzocone v. Willing, 369 A.2d 829, 836-38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976) (dissenting 
opinion); Stansbury v. Beckstrom, 491 S.W.2d 947 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). 
141. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 580A 6 (1976), which provides as follows: 
Notwithstanding the penalties herein provided, any court of general 
equity jurisdiction may enjoin conduct proscribed by this article, and 
may in any such proceeding award damages, including punitive 
damages, against the persons found guilty of actions made unlawful by 
this section. 
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to time, place, and manner. 142 Presumably, such a statute properly 
could limit residential picketing to daylight hours in order to 
minimize its disruptive effects upon picketed neighborhoods. The 
time limitations should not be so broad, however, that picketers 
could conduct their activity only during the hours in which the 
target of the picketing would probably be at work. Residential 
picketing, accordingly, should be permitted on weekends, or 
alternatively, during evening hours. 
The Supreme Court has indicated that a statute may require that 
door to door solicitors first notify police, provided the notice 
requirement serves a valid state interest. 143 A similar requirement 
for persons desiring to picket a private home is justified by the 
historic propensity of residential picketing to escalate into vio-
lence. 144 Kovacs v. Cooper145 and Grayned v. City of Rockford146 
would seem to indicate that a state may require residential picketers 
to parade quietly. The ordinance approved by the Supreme Court in 
Grayned presents a model for enacting a noise restriction on 
residential picketing. 147 
The following statute is one that would protect the interests of 
privacy and public safety to the extent constitutionally permissible 
in Maryland: 
(a) No person shall engage in picketing before or about the 
residence of any individual unless the person engaging 
in such picketing shall have notified the police depart-
ment of the municipality or county in which the 
picketing is to occur at least 24 hours before the 
commencement of the picketing; 
(b) No person shall engage in picketing before or about the 
residence of any individual between the hours of 6 P.M. 
and 9 A.M; 
(c) No person, while engaging in picketing before or about 
the residence of any individual, shall willfully make or 
142. 280 Md. at 316, 372 A.2d at 1081; see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965). 
143. See Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17, 619-20 (1976) (ordinance 
requiring door to door solicitors to notify police before beginning activity 
declared unconstitutionally vague; dicta indicating properly drawn statute would 
be upheld). 
144. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 126-30 (1969) (appendix to 
concurring opinion of Black, J.); Village of Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of 
America, 51 Ill. App. 3d 279,366 N.E.2d 347 (1977); State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 
265 N.W. 302 (1936). 
145. See text accompanying notes 75-78 supra. 
146. See text accompanying notes 51-55 supra. 
147. The ordinance reads: 
No person, while on public or private grounds adjacent to any building 
in which a school or any class thereof is in session, shall willfully make 
or assist in the making of any noise or diversion which disturbs or tends 
to disturb the peace or good order of such school session or class thereof. 
408 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1972). 
1977] Casenotes 
assist in the making of any noise or diversion which can 
be heard within any residence, and which is of such a 
nature as to disturb the occupants of that residence. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
129 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet dealt with a constitu-
tional challenge to a statute prohibiting residential picketing, 
various decisions of the Court seem to indicate that such picketing 
is, at least to some extent, a constitutionally protected activity. While 
other decisions of the Court establish a right of privacy in the home, 
they do not appear to go so far as to justify constitutionally a total 
ban on picketing of private dwellings. The view that residential 
picketing may be barred because of its coercive impact or because 
alternative sites are available at which to picket appears no longer 
to be tenable following recent decisions of the Court. While the 
constitutionality of a limited exemption for domestic workers in a 
residential picketing statute is uncertain, a broad exemption for all 
labor picketing constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause 
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
appears, therefore, to have been correct in declaring the state's 
residential picketing statute unconstitutional on grounds of both 
freedom of speech and equal protection. 
The common citizen has little if any access to public officials, 
especially on the national and state level. Correspondence is 
answered by form letter; telephone calls seldom pass through the 
barrier of secretaries. By contrast, the rich and the powerful, 
together with the special interest lobbyist, have easy access to public 
officials. In an era when access to the courts has passed largely 
beyond the financial reach of millions of Americans, residential 
picketing may be a last, albeit highly imperfect, method by which a 
citizen consumer, or tenant can confront effectively a public official, 
businessman, or landlord. Residential picketing may be, in the 
words of Justice Black, "essential to the poorly financed causes of 
little people."148 A dictum of a federal judge written thirty years ago 
is equally true today: 
To ban such activity because it is unpleasant to have such 
publicity at home is to admit the effectiveness of this kind of 
free expression. Picketing of this type brings home the fact 
that a man may leave his tools at his work but not his 
conscience or his relations with his fellow man.149 
Alan Cohen 
148. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 146 (1943). 
149. United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Baldwin, 67 F. Supp. 235, 242 (D. 
Conn. 1946). 
